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Abstract
We study the classic sequential screening problem under ex-post participation constraints. Thus
the seller is required to satisfy buyers’ ex-post participation constraints. A leading example is the
online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently cannot use up-front fees and instead
use transaction-contingent fees.
We establish when the optimal selling mechanism is static (buyers are not screened) or dynamic
(buyers are screened), and obtain a full characterization of such contracts. We begin by analyzing
our model within the leading case of exponential distributions with two types. We provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for the optimality of the static contract. If the means of the two types are
sufficiently close, then no screening is optimal. If they are sufficiently apart, then a dynamic contract
becomes optimal. Importantly, the latter contract randomizes the low type buyer while giving a
deterministic allocation to the high type. It also makes the low type worse-off and the high type
better-off compared to the contract the seller would offer if he knew the buyer’s type. Our main
result establishes a necessary and sufficient condition under which the static contract is optimal for
general distributions. We show that when this condition fails, a dynamic contract that randomizes
the low type buyer is optimal.
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tract.
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In many markets, sellers are constrained to sell products in such a way that buyers obtain a non-negative
net utility once they have realized their valuation. A leading example is the online display advertising
market. In this setting, typical business constraints impose that publishers cannot use up-front fees
and thus instead run a series of “waterfall auctions” that implicitly impose different priorities over
participants. Commonly, higher-priority auctions have higher reserves. 1 Another example, is online
shopping, in which shoppers have the chance to return the purchased item after delivery, usually at no
or low cost.
Motivated by this, we study the sequential screening problem as described by Courty and Li (2000)
and in order to match our previous narrative we incorporate ex-post participation constraints. The goal
of this work is to understand when the optimal selling mechanism is static (buyers are not screened
ex-ante) or dynamic (buyers are screened ex-ante) and obtain a full characterization of such contracts.
Our model considers a seller who is selling one unit of an object, at no cost to the seller, to a
buyer who has an outside option of zero. The sequence of events occurs in two periods. In the first,
the buyer privately learns her type and the parties contract—we restrict our analysis to two types of
buyers (low and high). The high type has a valuation distribution that dominates the low type one. The
contract specifies allocation and payment functions. In the second period, the buyer privately learns
her valuation, and allocations and transfers are realized. At this point, the buyer only accepts the
contracting terms if her realized net utility is weakly larger than her outside option. This model aligns
with our aforementioned examples. In the case of display advertising, the first period can be thought of
as the time at which the buyer decide in which auction (priority/reserve) to participate in. The second
period is when the auction is actually run. We begin by analyzing our model in the case of exponential
valuations, which allow us to obtain clean and intuitive closed-form expressions. We then provide a
general version of the results.
1.2 Our Results
One of our main contributions is to characterize when a static contract—that is, a contract that does not
sequentially screen buyers—is optimal. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality
of the aforementioned contract. For further reference, we call this condition (NR). The characterization
1See, for example, https://adexchanger.com/the-sell-sider/the-programmatic-waterfall-mystery.
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we provide is an average monotonicity condition around the optimal static threshold that encodes
information about the similarity of the ex-ante types. For example, in the case of exponential valuations,
the static contract is optimal if and only if the means of the distributions of the low and high type are
appropriately close.
Our second main contribution characterizes the optimal mechanism when the condition mentioned
above does not hold and a static contract is no longer optimal. Specifically, we prove that the opti-
mal dynamic contract randomizes the low type and gives a deterministic allocation to the high type.
Basically, randomization occurs to prevent the high type buyer from taking the low type’s contract.
To prove this, we first show that when (NR) is not satisfied, such a sequential screening contract with
random allocations becomes feasible and yields an improvement in the seller’s revenue compared to the
static contract. Even though this contract yields an improvement over the static one, it does not need
to be optimal. However, we are able to identify some regularity conditions that imply optimality.
More specifically, the optimal contract is characterized by an allocation probability χ ∈ (0, 1), and
three thresholds θ1, θ2, and θ3 with θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ3. In this contract, the seller allocates the object to a
low-type buyer with probability χ whenever her valuation is between θ1 and θ3, and asks for a payment
of θ1 ·χ. When the valuation of this type is above θ3, the object is always allocated to her and the seller
demands a payment of θ3 − (θ3 − θ1) · χ. The high-type buyer gets the object with certainty and only
when her valuation is above θ2, at which point the payment she has to make to the seller is θ2. These
parameters are set in such a way that the ex-ante incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied.
A salient feature of this type of contract is that it discriminates the low type in two dimensions.
First, it can be proven that θ1 is above the optimal threshold a seller would set if she was selling
exclusively to low-type buyers. That is, the low type buyer is being allocated the object less often in the
presence of high type buyers. An opposite result is true for high-type buyers, they are being allocated
the object more often than if they were alone. Second, there is a range of values for which the object is
sold to the low type with some probability, which further reduces the chances of a low type to receive
the object compared to a case in which there are no high-type buyers. All these values and properties
can be clearly expressed for the exponential distribution case. At the end of the paper, we discuss
directions on how to expand our analysis and results.
1.3 Related Work
Our model builds on the sequential screening literature as pioneered by Courty and Li (2000), in which
there is a buyer who sequentially and privately learns her true valuation. In this classic paper, the buyer
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only has partial information about her valuation ex-ante when signing a contract to which she can fully
commit. This feature is represented by an ex-ante participation constraint. In contrast, in this paper
we give the option to the buyer to quit the relationship ex-post after acquiring complete information
about her valuation. We represent this by an ex-post participation constraint.
The closest paper to ours that studies sequential screening with ex-post participation constraints is
Krähmer and Strausz (2015). They establish that the static contract is optimal under a monotonicity
condition regarding the cross-hazard rate functions. This condition imposes strong restrictions on
the primitives as it rules out common valuation distributions such as the exponential distribution.
Furthermore, the condition is only sufficient and thus gives an incomplete characterization of the space
of primitives for which the static contract is optimal. However, Krähmer and Strausz (2014) also
acknowledge the existence of a necessary condition for the optimality of the static contract. In our
paper, for the setting of a single buyer and two ex-ante types, we close this gap by providing a necessary
and sufficient condition under which the static contract is optimal. Further and importantly, when our
condition breaks we characterize the optimal dynamic mechanism and show that randomization of one
of the ex-ante types is required for optimality.2 In terms of approaches, Krähmer and Strausz (2015)
relax both the low to high IC and monotonicity constraints and then show that, under their condition,
the contract that maximizes the Lagrangian is deterministic and that as a result the static contract is
optimal. In contrast, we also relax the same IC constraint but we keep monotonicity. For the relaxed
problem, we perform a first-principle analysis, in the style of Samuelson (1984) and Fuchs and Skrzypacz
(2015), that leads us to identify not only the right structure of the optimal contract but also the main
objects of analysis. In turn, this permits us not only to determine our necessary and sufficient condition
but also to characterize the optimal dynamic contract when our condition breaks. In related recent
work, Heumann (2016) considers a setting in which a seller can design the screening mechanism as well
as the information disclosure mechanism with ex-post participation constraints.
The sequential nature of our model and the incorporation of ex-post (IR) is related to the work
of Ashlagi, Daskalakis, and Haghpanah (2016) and Balseiro, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme (2016). These
authors consider a model in which a seller, constrained by ex-post IR (also motivated by the display
advertising market), repeatedly sells objects to a buyer whose valuations are independent across periods.
Both papers provide characterizations for a nearly optimal mechanism. They are different from ours
2See also Manelli and Vincent (2007) and Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2015) for examples of multi-good
environments in which stochastic allocations can improve over deterministic ones. In a related note, Krähmer and Strausz
(2016) establish that with multiple, as opposed to a single good, generically, the static contract is not optimal for the
sequential screening problem with ex-post participation constraints.
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because we consider a single sale and construct the exactly optimal mechanism in a sequential screening
model.
Related to the display advertising setting, our paper is related to the BIN-TAC auction introduced
by Celis, Lewis, Mobius, and Nazerzadeh (2014). In this auction, buyers can opt to buy an impression
at a relatively high buy-it-now (BIN) price. If no buyers purchase at the BIN price, there is a take-
a-chance (TAC) stage in which the winner is randomly selected. The BIN-TAC auction is a relatively
simple and intuitive design that aims to approximate the optimal static Myerson auction with ironing in
the non-regular case. The paper does not provide a mechanism design analysis of BIN-TAC; however, it
numerically compares its outcome with the Myerson optimal auction showing that it achieves close-to-
optimal outcomes in many contexts of interest. Even though our setting is different because of sequential
screening, it is interesting to note that our optimal dynamic mechanism has a similar flavor to the TAC
stage in that it randomizes the allocation for low types.
2 The Model
We consider a seller (he) who is selling one unit of an object at zero cost to a buyer (she) who has
an outside option of zero. Both parties are risk-neutral and have quasilinear utility functions. The
sequence of events unfolds in two periods. In the first period, the buyer privately learns her type and
then the parties contract. The type provides information about the buyer’s valuation distribution. The
contract specifies allocation and payment functions. In the second period, the buyer privately learns
her valuation, and allocations and transfers are realized. At this point the buyer only accepts the
contracting terms if her net realized utility is larger than her outside option.
In the first period both parties do not possess information about the buyer’s valuation θ (or ex-
post type) but the buyer privately knows her type k (or ex-ante type). We assume that the buyer has
probability αk of being of type k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, with
∑K
k=1 αk = 1 and αk > 0. In the second period, a
buyer of type k privately learns her valuation θ which we assume to have cdf Fk(·) and pdf fk(·), with
full support in [0, θ̄] (possibly infinite). It will be convenient to denote the upper cdf by F̄k(·) , 1−Fk(·).
All the distributions are common knowledge.
The terms of trade are specified in the first period by the seller. For a payment t ∈ R and a
probability of receiving the object x ∈ [0, 1], a buyer with valuation θ receives a utility of θ ·x− t, while
the seller gets paid t. We assume that the buyer agrees to purchase the object only if she is guaranteed
a non-negative net utility for any possible valuation of the object she might have. That is, we require
θ · x − t to be non-negative for all θ. The seller’s problem is to design a contract that maximizes his
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expected payment, constrained to guaranteeing the buyer a non-negative realized ex-post utility.
In general, two types of contract can arise as a solution to the seller’s problem: static and dynamic.
A static contract does not screen among ex-ante types and, therefore, offers to all of them the same
terms of trade. A dynamic contract offers different contracting conditions for different ex-ante types.
For example, if we had only low or high valuation buyers, a static contract would offer a unique menu
of transfers and allocations, while a dynamic contract would offer two menus and each type of buyer
would self-select into one of the menus.
2.1 Mechanism Design Formulation
By means of the revelation principle (see, e.g., Myerson (1979) ) we can focus on incentive compatible
direct revelation mechanisms, with allocations xk : [0, θ̄] → [0, 1] and transfers tk : [0, θ̄] → R, that
depend on the types (k, θ) reported to the mechanism. Then, for a buyer reporting an ex-ante type
k′ and an ex-post type θ′ the mechanism allocates the object with probability xk′(θ
′) and charges the
buyer tk′(θ
′).
We define the ex-post utility of a buyer who reported k in the first period and θ′ in the second period
while her true valuation is θ as
uk(θ; θ
′) , θ · xk(θ′)− tk(θ′),
with the understanding that uk(θ) equals uk(θ; θ) . Similarly, we define the ex-ante expected utility of






{uk′(z; θ′)} · fk(z)dz,
where the maximum is included because double deviations are allowed.
There are two kinds of incentive compatibility constraints that must be satisfied by our mechanism.
The first one is ex-post incentive compatibility or (ICxp) constraint which requires that for any report
in the first period, truth-telling is optimal in the second period, that is,
uk(θ) ≥ uk(θ; θ′) ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},∀θ ∈ [0, θ̄]. (ICxp)
The second one is ex-ante incentive compatibility or (ICxa) constraint which requires that truth-telling
is optimal in the first period, that is,
Ukk ≥ Ukk′ ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (ICxa)
Also, we require the mechanism to satisfy an ex-post individual rationality constraint or (IRxp)
uk(θ) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, ∀θ ∈ [0, θ̄]. (IRxp)
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s.t (ICxa), (ICxp), (IRxp)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 .
Observe that (IRxp) implies ex-ante individual rationality. In fact, if we were to relax (P) by considering
only ex-ante individual rationality we would be in the setting of Courty and Li (2000) for discrete ex-ante
types.
3 Elementary Characterizations
We can obtain a more amenable characterization of the constraints by eliminating the transfer from the
constraints.
Lemma 1 The mechanism (x, t) satisfies (ICxa),(ICxp) and (IRxp) if and only if
1. xk(·) is a non-decreasing function for all k in {1, . . . ,K} and
uk(θ) = uk(0) +
∫ θ
0
xk(z)dz, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},∀θ ∈ [0, θ̄]. (1)
2. uk(0) ≥ 0 for all k in {1, . . . ,K}.
3. uk(0) +
∫ θ̄
0 xk(z)F̄k(z)dz ≥ uk′(0) +
∫ θ̄
0 xk′(z)F̄k(z)dz for all k, k
′ in {1, . . . ,K}.
Proof. The proof of this result is standard and, thus, omitted.
The first condition in the lemma is the standard envelope condition and it comes from the ex-
post incentive compatibility constraint. The second condition is derived from the ex-post individual
rationality constraint and the fact that uk(θ) is non-decreasing. The third condition is simply the
envelope formula plugged into the ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint.
Lemma (1) enables us to obtain a more compact formulation for the seller’s problem. Specifically,
we can use equation (1) and integration by parts to write down the objective of (P) in terms of the
allocation rule x and the lowest ex-post type utilities {uk(0)}Kk=1. Also, we can consider each uk(0) as
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s.t xk(θ) non-decreasing, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}




xk(z)F̄k(z)dz ≥ uk′ +
∫ θ̄
0
xk′(z)F̄k(z)dz, ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
where µk(·) is the virtual valuation of the ex-ante type k defined as:
µk(θ) , θ −
F̄k(θ)
fk(θ)
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},∀θ ∈ [0, θ̄].
Note that in (Pd) the variables are the allocation rule x and the vector of lowest ex-post type utilities
u. Further, once we solve for this variables the transfers are determined by equation (1).
Note that a solution to (Pd) that screens the ex-ante types is a dynamic contract. However, note
that a solution to (Pd) can also be static as it might pool the ex-ante types into a single type. Formally,
we say that a solution to (Pd) or contract is static when xk(·) ≡ x(·) and uk ≡ u for all k in {1, . . . ,K}.
It turns out that solving (Pd) over the space of static contracts is a simpler problem. The (ICxa)
constraints disappear from the problem because in this case there is effectively only one ex-ante type.
Also, it is clear that any optimal solution sets uk = 0 for all k in {1, . . . ,K}. So, the static version of












which corresponds to the classic optimal mechanism design problem, where the term in parenthesis
corresponds to the virtual values of the mixture distribution times the density function of the mixture.
The main focus of this paper is two-fold. First, to study when the optimal solutions to the static and
dynamic programs, (Ps) and (Pd), coincide. Second, when they are not the same, we aim to characterize
the optimal solution to (Pd).
We say that an allocation rule x(·) : [0, θ̄]→ [0, 1] is a threshold allocation characterized by θ̃ ∈ [0, θ̄]
if
x(θ) =
1 if θ ≥ θ̃0 if θ < θ̃.
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4 Leading Example: Exponential Distribution
Before we begin developing our general theory and in order to build intuition we provide our results for
exponentially distributed valuations. In particular, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for
the static contract to be optimal and, we also give a full characterization of the optimal static contract
and the dynamic contract when optimal.
We consider K = 2 and the density functions
fk(θ) = λke
−λkθ, k = {L,H} θ ≥ 0.
We assume λL > λH , so L and H stand for low and high type respectively. Note that H dominates L
in the sense of the hazard rate stochastic order and the first order stochastic dominance. In addition,
for the ex-ante probabilities we have αL + αH = 1 with αL, αH > 0.
We begin by studying the optimal solution to the static formulation. The optimal static contract
is given by a threshold allocation.3 Thus, in the exponential case the seller’s expected revenue for any




(α1µ1(θ)f1(θ) + α2µ2(θ)f2(θ))dθ = αLθe
−λLθ + αHθe
−λHθ.










−λHθ = 0, (2)
that is, the optimal threshold is a zero of the mixture virtual valuation. Notice that equation (2) cannot
be explicitly solve; however, we can (as we do in the forthcoming results) provide comparative statics.
Interestingly, in Proposition 2 below, we show that we can obtain explicit expressions for the thresholds
characterizing the optimal dynamic contract.
The following lemma provides some initial properties of the optimal static contract.




(2). Also, θs is a non-increasing function of αL with θ
s(0) = 1λH and θ
s(1) = 1λL .
We thus establish that the optimal allocation is given by a threshold allocation between 1/λL and
1/λH . Note that the optimal static contract allocates using the mixture of the valuation distributions
for the low and high types which cross zero at 1/λL and 1/λH , respectively. Finally, the monotonicity
3See, e.g., Riley and Zeckhauser (1983).
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property in Lemma 2 implies that as the proportion of low types increases, the optimal threshold should
be closer to the one the seller would set if the only ex-ante type was the low type.
Next, we state a necessary and sufficient condition for the static contract to be optimal.




We note that the left hand side, θs, is a solution to equation (2) and, therefore, it also depends on
the parameters λL and λH . Subsequent corollaries provide sharper characterizations that only depend
on model primitives. It is also worth mentioning that equation (3) possesses a general analog. As a
matter of fact, in Section 5.2 we state the general version of this necessary and sufficient condition.
Proposition 1 provides an intuitive characterization for when the seller is better-off screening the
ex-ante types than not. In terms of equation (3), when λL and λH are sufficiently close then the ratio
1/(λL−λH) is large and, therefore, equation (3) should hold, in which case the static contract is optimal.
Conversely, when λL and λH are sufficiently apart from each other the ratio 1/(λL − λH) is small and
potentially smaller than θs, so the static contract might not longer be optimal.
At a more intuitive level, when the ex-ante types are similar any contract that screens the types
would be close in terms of expected revenue to the static contract because for each type it could get at
most what it would get by setting thresholds 1/λL and 1/λH for each type, but θ




when screening, the seller has to pay an extra cost to prevent the types from mimicking each other and,
since the contracts’ revenue will be similar, it is likely that this cost offsets the earnings from screening.
On the other hand, when ex-ante types are sufficiently apart in their mean valuation then the seller can
tailor the contract to each type and in this way extract more from them than in the static contract.
Corollary 1 Assume λL ∈ (λH , 2λH ], then for any αL ∈ [0, 1] the static contract is optimal.
This result establishes that when the distributions of the low and high type buyers are sufficiently
close to each other then no matter in which proportion the types are, the static contract is always
optimal.
Corollary 2 Assume λL > 2λH , then there exists ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all αL ∈ (0, ᾱ) the dynamic
contract is strictly optimal and for all αL ∈ [ᾱ, 1] the static contract is optimal.
Corollary 2 asserts that when the mean of the low and high type buyers are sufficiently different
then both contracts can be optimal. If the proportion of low type is low enough (but not zero) then the
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seller is better-off screening the types. On the other hand, if there is a very large proportion of low type
buyers then the static contract is optimal. This follows because as αL increases, one can show that θ
s
decreases, and at some point condition (3) holds. This discussion suggests our final corollary.
Corollary 3 For λH and αH fixed, there exists λ̄L larger than 2λH such that for all λL ∈ [λ̄L,∞) the
dynamic contract is strictly optimal.
Now we provide a characterization of the optimal dynamic contract.
Proposition 2 Assume equation (3) does not hold, then the optimal allocations are
x?L(θ) =
0 if θ < θLχ if θL ≤ θ and x?H(θ) =
0 if θ < θH1 if θH ≤ θ,
with optimal transfers t?L(θ) = θL · χ · 1{θ≥θL} and t
?


























This results aligns with the discussion succeeding Proposition 1. When the types are different enough
from each other or, equivalently, when equation (3) does not hold then it is optimal to screen the types.
That’s why in Proposition 2 we have different allocations for low and high type buyers. The low type
buyers are allocated the object more frequently ( θL ≤ θH) but they are randomized. This is done as a
way to prevent the buyers from mimicking each other. Specifically, we must have θL ≤ θH ; otherwise,
the low type buyers would have an incentive to pretend being the high type since that would get them
allocated the object more often and at a lower price. In general, for exponential valuations the ex-ante
IC constraint for the high type is binding.
It is worth noting that the dynamic contract makes the low type worse-off and the high type better-
off with respect to the contract the seller would offer if he could perfectly screen each type. For the
low type that contract would set a threshold equal to 1/λL and would always allocate the object when
her value is above the threshold. However, the dynamic contract allocates the object to the low type
whenever her valuation is above θL > 1/λL and with some probability. So the low type is worse-off in
two dimensions, it is allocated the object less often and with less probability. On the other hand, the
high type buyer gets allocated the object more often and with certainty because θH < 1/λH .
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In order to better understand the role of the ex-post IR constraints it is useful to compare our solution
to the one we would obtain if we only had ex-ante IR constraints. In the latter case, the solution can
be derived following Courty and Li (2000).4 This solution always allocates the object to the high type
and it allocates the object to the low type whenever her valuation is above some threshold θ∗(possible
infinite). Furthermore, the utilities for the lowest ex-post types satisfy uH < uL ≤ 0. Clearly this
solution, that uses up-front fees, is not feasible in our context as the high type buyer has negative utility
for her lowest valuation. Moreover, the allocations differ for both the static and dynamic contracts.
We now illustrate our findings with numerical results where we vary the difference in the mean
between the low and the high type. Specifically, we fix αL to be 0.7 and λH to be 0.5, that is, the high
type has mean 2. Since we are assuming λL > λH , we consider λL to be λH + δ with δ > 0. Figure
1 shows how the different thresholds vary as δ increases or, equivalently, as the mean of the low type
decreases to zero. As we can see, there is a value of δ (δ =0.93) to the left of which the static contract
is optimal and to its right the dynamic contract is optimal. This aligns with Proposition 1, because as
δ increases 1/(λL − λH) decreases converging to zero and, therefore, we expect it to be below θs (see
Corollary 2 and Corollary 3). At a more intuitive level as δ increases both distribution become more
and more different from each other with one of them having a larger average value than the other. Thus,
there is a gain in screening the types.









Figure 1: Optimal thresholds for static and dynamic contracts when setting λL = λH +δ, with αL = 0.7
and λH = 0.5.
4Note that the exponential distribution satisfies first order stochastic dominance; however, the virtual valuations as






and µH(θ) = θ, do not satisfy the regularity
condition because µL(θ) is not non-decreasing. Nonetheless, it is still possible to obtain the optimal mechanism.
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In terms of thresholds, for the static contract we observe that θs is decreasing at the beginning and
then it increases and goes close to 1/λH = 2. This happens because as we increase δ we are making
1/λL smaller ; however, at some point this value is too small and, therefore, the probability of allocating
the object to a low type, P (value low type > θs) = e−λLθ
s
, is going to be so low that the seller will be
better off by choosing a threshold tailored for the high type, that is, close to 1/λH = 2. For the dynamic
thresholds, the one for the low type is decreasing while the one for the high type is increasing. This
makes sense because in the dynamic case the seller can adjust the threshold for each type; hence, as δ
increases the distributions become more and more different and, therefore, is optimal to set thresholds
closer and closer to the threshold a seller would set if he knew the types in advance, that is, 1/λL and
1/λH . Also, note that from equation (4) we see that χ is a decreasing function of δ because as the mean
of the low type goes to zero we are less and less constrained to offer a high probability of allocation;
however, in the limit χ(δ) ≈ e−1, hence even though the low type buyers will have values concentrated
at zero we still need to offer them a positive probability of allocation so that we prevent them from
mimicking the high type buyers.
We can also compare the different mechanism in terms of revenue. Note that from Proposition 2,
we can derive the optimal revenue for the dynamic contract:
Rd = αL · χ · θL · e−λLθL + αH · θH · e−λHθH .
Then, we can plot the different revenues as we vary δ. Figure 2 depicts the results. For values of δ above
0.93 the dynamic contract dominates the static one reaching an improvement of 16.5%. Note that when
δ grows large the improvement of the dynamic over the static decrease because both contracts set the

























Figure 2: Left: Optimal expected revenue for static, dynamic and ex-ante (IR) contracts. Right:
Percentage improvement of the dynamic over the static contract. In both figures we set set λL = λH +δ,
with αL = 0.7 and λH = 0.5
5 General Results: K = 2
In this section we present our main results for the case when we have two ex-ante types and general
valuation distributions. We begin with notation and stating the main objects of our analysis. Then we
provide the main results for both the static and dynamic contracts. In particular, this section generalizes
Proposition 1 by providing a sharp necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of the static
contract. Then we provide a general statement, similar to Proposition 2, for the characterization of the
optimal dynamic contract.
First, we give some definitions that are standard in the mechanism design literature.
Definition 1 (threshold) We define the smallest threshold to be:
θ̂k , min{θ ∈ [0, θ̄] : µk(θ) ≥ 0}, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
where µk(·) is the virtual valuation function of type k.
Also we define the hazard rate and cross-hazard rate functions as follows.




, ∀`, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},∀θ ∈ [0, θ̄],
where when ` equals k we refer to this function as hazard rate, and when ` does not equal k we refer to
it as cross-hazard rate.
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With out loss of generality we assume
θ̂1 ≤ · · · ≤ θ̂K , (5)
one way of thinking about this is in terms of hazard rate stochastic order. For example consider K = 2,
then:
h22(θ) ≥ h11(θ), ∀θ ∈ [0, θ̄]⇔ θ − h22(θ) ≤ θ − h11(θ)⇔ µ2(θ) ≤ µ1(θ)⇒ θ̂1 ≤ θ̂2.
That is, hazard rate stochastic order implies the order of the thresholds {θ̂k}Kk=1. Hence, for K = 2 we
can think of type 2 as being the high valuation type and type 1 as being the low valuation type.
As it is standard in the mechanism design literature we make the following assumption, which we
keep for the rest of paper, about the hazard rate function
hkk(θ) are non-increasing in θ. (DHR)
This assumption is satisfied by a large class of distributions, for example, all log-concave distributions
satisfy condition (DHR). An important consequence of this condition is that it implies the virtual val-
uation functions are increasing and, therefore, the thresholds {θ̂}Kk=1 are uniquely determined. Another
related condition is about the cross-hazard rate functions,
h`k(θ) are non-increasing in θ, ∀`, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (R)
To the best of our knowledge condition (R) was first introduced in the context of sequential screening
by Krähmer and Strausz (2015). In that paper the authors show that under condition (R) the optimal
solution to (Pd) and to (Ps) coincide, that is, the static contract is optimal. However, condition (R)
is very demanding and there are many common distribution that do not satisfy it. In fact, our leading




, `, k = 1, 2.
If we consider λ1 > λ2 then h
12(θ) is an increasing function and, therefore, it violates conditions (R).
However, notice (DHR) is satisfied because the simple hazard rate functions are constant and equal to
1/λk.








, ∀`, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},∀θ ∈ [0, θ̄].
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In words, the c`k-ratios correspond to the quotient between type `’s virtual valuation and the cross-
hazard rate function between types ` and k. These quantities are the same as introduced in Krähmer and
Strausz (2014) Section 8.4, to study the role of the cross-hazard rate functions. They provide a sufficient
condition using these ratios and show that if the static contract is optimal then the c-ratios must be
weakly increasing around θs. Also, note that condition (R) implies that the c-ratios are increasing. In
contrast, condition (DHR) implies that only the ckk-ratios are increasing.
The next definition introduces weighted averages of the c-ratios.








, ∀`, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, 0 ≤ θa ≤ θb ≤ θ̄.
The quantity C`k(θa, θb) represents the average value of c
`k weighted by the tail CDF of type k for
values of θ between θa and θb. As it will become clear in Section 5.2 these ratios are relevant for the
characterization of the optimal mechanism.
5.1 Static Contract
In Section 2 we defined a static contract as one that does not screen the ex-ante types and, therefore,
it sets uk ≡ u and xk ≡ x for all k in {1, . . . ,K}. Thus, a static contract can be cast as the optimal
solution to (Ps). From this formulation we see that the relevant quantity that shapes the allocation
x(·) is µ̄(θ) ,
∑K
k=1 αkµk(θ)fk(θ). In general, independent of any regularity assumptions imposed over
µ̄(θ), the optimal way to choose a non-decreasing allocation x(·) that maximizes∫ θ̄
0
x(z)µ̄(z)dz, (6)
is a threshold allocation (see, e.g., Myerson (1981) or Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)). We summarize this
and some other properties of the optimal solution in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The solution to (Ps) is a threshold allocation characterized by θs in [θ̂1, θ̂K ], maximizing
(6). In addition, θs satisfies the following properties for K = 2:
1. Is a solution to α1c
12(θs) + α2c
22(θs) = 0.
2. Is a non-increasing function of α1 with θ
s(0) = θ̂2 and θ
s(1) = θ̂1.
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The fact that θs is in the interval [θ̂1, θ̂K ] and property (2), follow the same intuition as in the
exponential case presented in Section 4. Property (1) is the optimality condition found by Riley and
Zeckhauser (1983) written in terms of the c-ratios, it establishes that the optimal threshold must be a
zero of µ̄(·).
5.2 Dynamic Contract
The purpose of this section it to characterize the conditions under which it is optimal to screen the
ex-ante types. In particular, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the static contract to be
optimal. For the cases in which the static contract is not optimal we characterize the optimal dynamic
contract.













s.t xk(θ) non-decreasing, ∀k = 1, 2








The difference between (PdR) and the original dynamic formulation lies in relaxing the type 1 to type 2 IC
constraint (or low to high IC constraint). Importantly, we are not relaxing the monotonicity constraint
and we can obtain a characterization of the optimal solution to (PdR) as stated by the following result.
Theorem 1 Consider problem (PdR), the optimal solution has allocations
x?1(θ) =

0 if θ < θ1
χ if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ3
1 if θ3 < θ,
x?2(θ) =




0 if θ < θ1
θ1 · χ if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ3
θ3 − (θ3 − θ1) · χ if θ3 < θ,
t?2(θ) =
0 if θ < θ2θ2 if θ2 ≤ θ.
for some values θ1, θ2, θ3 with θ̂1 ≤ θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ3, θ2 ≤ θ̂2. And u2 = u1 = 0.
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Next we provide an informal and intuitive description of what leads us to Theorem 1. This de-
scription adapts techniques from Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) that enable us to derive the allocations’
structure. We begin with ex-ante type 2, consider an allocation x?2(θ) equal to some χ in some interval
(θa, θb), with χ ∈ (0, 1). Then the part of the objective for the ex-ante type 2 in this interval is




If µ2(θ̂) ≥ 0 for some θ̂ ∈ (θa, θb) then because of (DHR), µ2(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ≥ θ̂ and, therefore, we can
always find a better solution by setting x?2(θ) = 1 for all θ ≥ θ̂ (note that this does not affect feasibility








otherwise we could decrease χ and obtain a strict improvement in the objective. Now, consider splitting


























or equivalently C22(θa, θ̂) ≤ C22(θ̂, θb). We can use this to find an improvement to the objective function.
























which by (7) is non-negative. Then we can keep increasing ε2 until either χ − ε1 = x?2(θa) or χ + ε2 =
x?2(θb). Hence, we can weakly improve the objective function by modifying the solution in a way that
for one of the two halves of the interval the step, χ, reaches the boundary given by either x?2(θa) or
x?2(θb). For the half that did not reach the boundary we can do the same procedure, which we can then
repeat until we eliminate the intermediate step χ completely. This argument shows why the high type
allocation is deterministic.
For the ex-ante type 1 (the low type) we can try to follow a similar argument; but, in order to obtain
an improvement to the objective function we would need the analogue of condition (7) to hold, which
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considering the high to low IC constraint is:
C12(θa, θ̂) ≤ C12(θ̂, θb). (8)
However, in general this condition is not satisfied, as the c-ratio c12(·) does not need to be a non-
decreasing function. Therefore, we cannot apply a similar argument to show we can restrict attention
to deterministic contracts for the low type. Nonetheless, the optimal contract can be shown to have
the structure given in Theorem 1. To see this, suppose for example that x?1(θ) equals χa in (θa, θ̂) and
χb in (θ̂, θb) with 0 < χa < χb < 1 , and also assume (8) does not hold. Then, we can increase χa and
decrease χb (maintaining feasibility) and obtain an improvement to the objective function. We can do
this until χa and χb collapse in a single value.
This discussion not only provides intuition about the structure of the optimal dynamic contract but
also highlights the importance of the k -averaged c-ratios. Roughly speaking, when (7) and (8) hold
we can find an improvement over a stochastic allocation, because we can modify the allocation to put
more weight where the average virtual valuation is higher.
Now, we state an important corollary for our analysis that follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that
allows us to focus on (PdR) when characterizing the static contract’s optimality.
Corollary 4 The static contract is an optimal solution to (Pd) if and only if it is an optimal solution
to (PdR).
Thus, to find a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of the static contract in (Pd) it
suffices to find such a condition for (PdR). The next theorem, which is one of our main results, provides
the condition. Note that the condition implies not only that the allocation must be deterministic, as
discussed in equation (8), but also that the static contract is optimal.








Condition (NR) is the general version of the condition in Proposition 1 for exponential valuations
regarding the similarity of the distributions of both types. Note that condition (R) implies the mono-
















≥ c12(θs), ∀θ ≥ θs.
Hence, the result by Krähmer and Strausz (2015) that if condition (R) holds then the static contract is
optimal follows as corollary of Theorem 2. We highlight that while condition (R) implies the c-ratios
are increasing, our condition (NR) only implies a type of monotonicity over an appropriate weighted
average of the c-ratios.
We can also compare Theorem 2 with Lemma 12 in Krähmer and Strausz (2014). In that lemma they
assume h22(θ) > h11(θ), which we already saw it implies θ̂1 < θ̂2, and they establish that a necessary
condition for the static contract to be optimal is to have the c-ratio c12(θ) being increasing at θs. Our
results also contains this lemma, because if c12(·) was decreasing at θs we can always find θ < θs and




so (NR) does not hold and, therefore, the static contract would not be optimal. Figure 3 illustrates how
our condition closes the gap between the ones by Krähmer and Strausz.
In terms of methodology, our approach differs from that of Krähmer and Strausz (2015). Their
approach consists of relaxing the low to high ex-ante IC constraint and then – by using their condition
(R) – they relax the monotonicity constraint and prove that the solution must be a threshold schedule
for each type. From there, they show that the threshold for both types must be equal and, therefore,
the static contract is optimal. In our approach we also use a relaxation of the general formulation, but
we do not impose any condition on the primitives and we do not relax the monotonicity constraint. We
perform a first principle analysis which allows us to understand what are the conditions under which is
possible to find objective improvements. From this analysis we not only determine the structure of the
optimal contract but we also identify the main objects of analysis, the k-averaged c-ratios. This leads
us to Theorem 1, once we have that result we realize that the static contract is optimal for the relaxed
problem if and only if it optimal for the original problem. Hence, to obtain a complete characterization
of the optimality of the static contract we can study (PdR). Then using this formulation, we use the
KKT conditions to show that condition (NR) yields a sharp characterization as stated in Theorem 2.
An important contribution of our work is that, to the best of our knowledge, we provide the first
characterization of the optimal dynamic contract when the necessary and sufficient condition associated
to the static contract being optimal fails. A first step towards this is given by the following proposition.




s, θb), for which the following allocation yields a strict improvement over the
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Outside this set the static contract




0 if θ < θa
χ if θa ≤ θ ≤ θb
1 if θb < θ,
x2(θ) =
0 if θ < θ
s






F̄2(z)dz. And we set u1 = u2 = 0.
In the proof of Proposition 3 we can see that as soon as condition (NR) breaks two things happen.
First, a non-static contract becomes feasible as it does not violate the incentive compatibility constraints.
Second, the same contract obtains a larger expected revenue than the static one. So, from this we see
that (NR) is preventing both the feasibility and optimality of a dynamic contract. In terms of the
k-averaged c-ratios, when (NR) fails to hold type 1’s average virtual value in (θa, θ
s) is larger than that
in (θs, θb). Hence, by increasing the static allocation in (θa, θ
s) and reducing it in (θs, θb) (in a feasible
manner) we can find a better dynamic allocation.
The next result characterizes the optimal dynamic contract and it also provides conditions that
allow to compute the optimal thresholds.
Theorem 3 Assume condition (NR) does not hold. Suppose there exist θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ1 such that
1. C12(θ1, θ1) ≤ minθ1≤θ≤θ̄ C12(θ1, θ).
2. max0≤θ≤θ1 C12(θ, θ1) ≤ C12(θ1, θ1)
3. α1 · C12(θ1, θ1) + α2c22(θ2) = 0.









Conditions (1), (2), and (3) of the theorem ensure that the IC constraint from the low ex-ante type
is satisfied, and can be thought as optimality conditions that characterize the thresholds. Intuitively,
condition (1) asserts that for any θ larger that θ1, type 1’s average virtual valuation is always above
its average value in the interval (θ1, θ1) and , therefore, always allocating the object for these values is
optimal. Condition (2) identifies an intermediate interval for which type 1’s average virtual valuation
is largest, thus maximizing what the seller can make from randomizing the low type in the interval
(θ1, θ1). Finally, condition (3) is simple a first order optimality condition on θ2.
This result generalizes Proposition 2. For the exponential distribution the conditions of the theorem
are always met. We note that in the exponential case we only have two intervals for the low type’s
allocation as we can show that θ1 =∞.
We would like to stress that conditions (1), (2), and (3) in the theorem are only sufficient conditions
for optimality. However, there is a more general approach to compute the optimal solution. The key
is that the optimal solution to (PdR) can be shown to be feasible for (Pd). Hence, it is enough to solve
(PdR). From Theorem 1 we already know that the optimal contract depends solely on the variables
θ1, θ2, θ3 and χ. It can be shown then that at optimality the IC constraint must bind and, therefore, χ
is a function of the thresholds. This implies that we can optimize the objective in (PdR) as a function of
the thresholds only and with no IC constraint.
5.3 Indirect Implementation
Next, we discuss how the optimal dynamic contract can be implemented in practice. By means of the
taxation principle we can verify that the following menu of contracts is an indirect implementation of
our optimal mechanism:
• Contract H: there is a single posted price of p2 = θ2.
• Contract L: in this case, the buyer can choose between two items:
(a) Buy at a price of p1 = θ1 · χ and be allocated with probability χ.
(b) Buy at a price of p1 = θ1 − (θ1 − θ1) · χ and be allocated with probability 1.
The prices in the above menu of contracts are set using the values in Theorem 3. This implementation
offers a posted price to the high type buyer, and gives to the low type buyer two options. In option (a)
the low type buyer can pay a low price but it can potentially not acquire the item; in (b), the low type
buyer pays a high price and always gets the object.
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An appealing feature of the implementation is that if we think of allocations as quantities, then we
can order the per unit prices. In contract L, the per unit prices are θ1 and θ1 · χ + θ1 · (1− χ) for (a)
and (b), respectively. Hence, the per unit price in (a) is less than or equal to the one in (b). That is,
the low type in (a) receives less of the good but at a discounted price compare to the low type in (b).
For contract H, the per unit price is θ2 and, since θ1 is less than or equal to θ2, the low type in (a)
receives less of the good at a discounted price compared to the high type buyer. To contrast the per
unit prices of the low type in (b) and the high type is less straightforward. Even-though θ2 is between
θ1 and θ1 we are not able to compare it to θ1 · χ + θ1 · (1 − χ). However, intuitively, if the high type
puts a large mass in values larger than θ1 then we expect the per unit price of the high type to be
below the one of the low type in (b) because, otherwise, the high type buyer would have an incentive
to take contract L. Equivalently, the high type or the low type in (b) have to pay a premium for the
additional quantity. We can also refer back to the exponential case of Section 4. From Proposition 2,
the premium the high type has to pay is given by θH − θL = log(1/χ)/λH and, therefore, the larger the
quantity the lower is the premium. Finally, note that this implementation accommodates the case in
which the static contract is optimal. In that case, we have χ = 1 and θ1 = θ2 = θ1 thus both contracts
are the same.
6 Future Work and Extensions
There are several directions in which we would like to extend the work presented in this paper.
The theoretical and numerical results we presented in this paper are for two ex-ante types. Even
though this setting is already rich and, as it was shown in Section 4 provides good economic insights,
a more general setting with more than just two ex-ante types is an important venue for future work.
We would like to extend Theorems 2 and 3 for multiple ex-ante types. In this sense, an interesting
question concerns the number of ‘intermediate classes’. Theorem 3 establishes that the low type buyer
has an interval in which she is allocated the object with some probability χ ∈ (0, 1); hence, there is
one intermediate class. An interesting question is whether the number of intermediate classes increases
with the number of ex-ante types. Also, is there a fixed number of intermediate classes that yield a
good approximation to the optimal solution for an arbitrary number of ex-ante types?
Related to the possible number of intermediate classes is the (DHR) assumption. As we saw in the
discussion after Theorem 1, the order of the k-averaged c-ratios plays an important role in determining
whether an allocation has an intermediate class or not. This order is guaranteed (or partially guaranteed)
by conditions over the cross-hazard rate or hazard rate functions such as (R) or (DHR). In fact, as we
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weaken condition (R) one intermediate class for the low type buyer emerges. Therefore we postulate
that if we weaken condition (DHR), then more intermediate class might appear, in particular, the high
type buyer now could have an intermediate class. However, in order to make this last point one has to
be careful because in this case relaxing the high type IC constraint might no longer be a valid relaxation
to the original formulation.
Another direction for future work is increasing the number of buyers. This has important practical
consequences particularly in industries that use market mechanisms like auctions, such as display ad-
vertising alluded at the beginning of the paper. We believe that our extension to multiple buyers will
allow us to study whether the market design of running a series of “waterfall auctions” with different




A Proofs for section 5
We will need the following auxiliary lemmata.
Lemma 4 Assume θ̂1 ≤ θ̂2, then
1. α1 minθs≤θ≤θ̄ C12(θ
s, θ) ≤ −α2c22(θs) ≤ α1 max0≤θ≤θs C12(θ, θs).
2. max0≤θ≤θs C12(θ, θ
s) ≤ minθs≤θ≤θ̄ C12(θs, θ) if and only if α1 max0≤θ≤θs C12(θ, θs) = −α2c22(θs) =
α1 minθs≤θ≤θ̄ C12(θ
s, θ).
Proof of Lemma 4. We prove (1) first. For the inequality involving the min consider ε > 0.









ε→0−→ α1c12(θs) = −α2c22(θs),
where in the equality we used Lemma 3. A similar argument applies to max0≤θ≤θs C12(θ, θ
s). Property
(2) is a direct consequence of what we have just proved for (1).
Lemma 5 Let θi ∈ [0, θ̄] for i = 1, 2, 3 be such that θ1 < θ2 < θ3. Also, consider functions f, g :
























































































Then, there exist θa, θb ∈ [0, θ̄] with θa < θs < θb such that C12(θa, θs) > C12(θs, θb). Note that this









Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose the result is not true. That is, for all θa, θb ∈ [0, θ̄] with θa < θs < θb
we have
C12(θa, θ
s) ≤ C12(θs, θb). (9)
Take ε > 0 and consider θb(ε) = θ
s + ε, then from equation (9) we have
C12(θa, θ
s) ≤ C12(θs, θs + ε), ∀ε > 0,
taking the limit as ε approaches to 0 yields C12(θa, θ





Using equation (9) again, we can do the same for the minimum and, therefore, we obtain a contradiction.




12(z)dz. Note that since θb > θ
s ≥ θ̂1 we have C12(θs, θb) >
0. Therefore, C12(θa, θ
s) > 0 which implies the desired inequality.
Proof of Lemma 3. The fact that the optimal solution is a threshold allocation and property
(1) are explained in the main text. Thus, we only need to provide a proof for θs being in the interval
[θ̂1, θ̂K ] and property (2).
We begin showing that θs belongs to the interval [θ̂1, θ̂K ]. Note that for all θ below θ̂1, µk(θ) is
negative for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Therefore, µ̄(θ) is negative for all θ below θ̂1. Similarly, for all θ above
θ̂K , µ̄(θ) is positive. Since the allocation is of the threshold type, it is optimal to set x(θ) equal to 0 for
θ below θ̂1 and to set x(θ) equal to 1 for θ above θ̂K . This necessarily implies that θ
s is in [θ̂1, θ̂K ].
As for Property (2), note first that θs can be seen as a function of α1 and α2 but since α2 equals
1 − α1, we can effectively consider θs just a function of α1. Then, when α1 equals 0 is as we only had
type 2 buyers and, therefore, the optimal threshold is θ̂2. While when α1 equals 1 is as we only had
type 1 buyers so the optimal threshold is θ̂1. Hence, θ
s(0) equals θ̂2 and θ
s(1) equals θ̂1.











α1f1(z)µ1(z) + (1− α1)f2(z)µ2(z)dz,
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1) ≤ `(θs(αb1), αb1)
= `(θs(αb1), α
b
1 − αa1) + `(θs(αb1), αa1)
≤ `(θs(αb1), αb1 − αa1) + `(θs(αa1), αa1)
therefore∫ θs(αb1)
θs(αa1)
αb1f1(z)µ1(z) + (1− αb1)f2(z)µ2(z)dz ≤
∫ θs(αb1)
θs(αa1)
αa1f1(z)µ1(z) + (1− αa1)f2(z)µ2(z)dz. (10)
Recall that θs is in [θ̂1, θ̂2] and, therefore, θ̂1 ≤ θs(αa1) < θs(αb1) ≤ θ̂2. This in turn implies that
µ1(z) > 0 and µ2(z) < 0, ∀z ∈ (θs(αa1), θs(αb1)),
so for z in (θs(αa1), θ
s(αb1)) we have
αa1f1(z)µ1(z) + (1− αa1)f2(z)µ2(z) < αb1f1(z)µ1(z) + (1− αb1)f2(z)µ2(z),
which contradicts (10).













s.t xk(θ) non-decreasing, ∀k = 1, 2








For any optimal solution to (PdR) two possible situations may arise:
1. The allocation has an interval in which is continuously strictly increasing.
2. The allocation does not have an interval in which is continuously strictly increasing, but is a
piecewise constant non-decreasing function.
The proof idea is as follows. For each ex-ante type, we prove that if we are in case (2), we can
modify the allocation in that interval to be constant and obtain at least a weak improvement in the
objective. This implies that for any optimal allocation, we can construct another optimal allocation
that is a piecewise constant non-decreasing function. Therefore, we can always assume we are in case
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(3). In this case, we show that for ex-ante type 1 there is only one intermediate step, and for ex-ante
type 2 there is no intermediate step. We split the proof in ex-ante type 1 and 2.
Let x?1(θ) and x
?
2(θ) denote the optimal allocations. We begin with ex-ante type 1.
•
• Ex-ante type 1 case (1): Suppose there is an interval (θ1, θ2) in which x?1(θ) is continuously
strictly increasing. Before we start with the main argument, note that if θ̂1 > θ1 then we can set
x?1(θ) to be equal to x
?
1(θ1) for all θ in (θ1, θ̂1). This strictly increases the objective function while
maintaining feasibility. So we can assume θ̂1 ≤ θ1, which in turn implies that µ1(·) is non-negative
in the interval (θ1, θ2).
Now we give the main argument. Note that by Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217), x?1(θ)
must maximize the Lagrangean
















with λ,w1, w2 ≥ 0. Define L1(·) by
L1(θ) , α1µ1(θ)f1(θ)− λF̄2(θ),
then it must be the case that L1(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Suppose this is not true, then we could
have θ̂ ∈ (θ1, θ2) such that L1(θ̂) > 0, since L1(·) is a continuous function this must also be true
for all θ ∈ (θ̂ − ε, θ̂ + ε) for ε > 0 small enough. But then we can obtain an strict improvement
by setting x1(θ) = x
?
1(θ̂ + ε) for all θ ∈ (θ̂ − ε, θ̂ + ε). A similar argument holds when L1(θ̂) < 0.




= λ, ∀θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). (11)

















where in the equality we have used (11). Now, consider modifying x?1 to be x̃
?
1 equal to x
?
1(θ̂) in
(θ1, θ2). Then from (11), (12) and (13) we get∫ θ2
θ1













































where in (a) we used equation (12).
• Ex-ante type 1 case (2): Suppose for x?1(·) there exists θ1 < θ2 < θ3 and 0 < χ1 < χ2 < 1
such that x?1(θ) = χ1 in (θ1, θ2) and x
?
1(θ) = χ2 in (θ2, θ3). Since type’s 1 allocation is piecewise
constant we must have x?1(θ
−





Then, the part of objective associated to ex-ante type 1 in these intervals is
α1 · χ1 ·
∫ θ2
θ1




If µ1(θ̂) ≤ 0 for some θ̂ ∈ (θ1, θ3) then because of (DHR), µ1(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ≤ θ̂ and, therefore,
we can always find a better solution by setting x?1(θ) = 0 for all θ ≤ θ̂ (note that this does not























: In this case consider decreasing χ2 by ε2 > 0 and increasing




F̄2(z)dz − ε2 ·
∫ θ3
θ2
F̄2(z)dz = 0. (16)















which under our current assumption is non-negative. So we can weakly improve our objective,
indeed we can do it so until χ1 + ε1 and χ2 − ε2 are equal,















since χ2 > χ1 we have ε2 > 0 and, therefore, we have shown that it is possible to increase
χ1 and to decrease χ2 in such a way the objective is weakly improved and the solution is













: In this case consider increasing χ2 by ε2 > 0 and decreasing
χ1 by ε1 > 0 in such a way that equation (15) remains with equality. By doing this the change
in the objective is strictly positive, and we do it until either χ1 = x
?(θ−1 ) or χ2 = x
?(θ+3 ).
This proves the result for ex-ante type 1 and case (2).
In conclusion, putting together what we have proved for cases (1) and (2), we can always consider
x?1 to be a step function with at most one intermediate step.
Now we proceed with ex-ante type 2.
• Ex-ante type 2 case (1): Suppose there is an interval (θ1, θ2) in which x?2(θ) is continuously
strictly increasing. Before we start with the main argument, note that if θ̂2 < θ2 then we can set
x?2(θ) to be equal to x
?
2(θ2) for all θ in (θ̂2, θ2). This strictly increases the objective function and
maintains feasibility. So we can assume θ̂2 ≥ θ2, which in turn implies that µ2(·) is non-positive
in the interval (θ1, θ2).
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Now we give the main argument. Note that by Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217), x?2(θ)
must maximize the Lagrangean
















with λ,w1, w2 ≥ 0. Define L2(·) by
L2(θ) , α2µ2(θ)f2(θ) + λF̄2(θ),
then it must be the case that L2(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Suppose this is not true, then we could
have θ̂ ∈ (θ1, θ2) such that L2(θ̂) > 0, since L2(·) is a continuous function this must also be true
for all θ ∈ (θ̂ − ε, θ̂ + ε) for ε > 0 small enough. But then we can obtain an strict improvement
by setting x2(θ) = x
?
2(θ̂ + ε) for all θ ∈ (θ̂ − ε, θ̂ + ε). A similar argument holds when L2(θ̂) < 0.




= −λ, ∀θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). (18)
















where in the equality we have used (18). Now, consider modifying x?2 to be x̃
?
2 equal to x
?
2(θ̂) in
(θ1, θ2). Then from (18), (19) and (20) we get∫ θ2
θ1














































where in (a) we used equation (19).
• Ex-ante type 2 case (2): Suppose x?2(·) is an optimal solution to (PdR) for which there exists
θ1 < θ2 and 0 < χ < 1 such that x
?
2(θ) = χ in (θ1, θ2). Similar to the proof of type 1 assume
x?2(θ
−





Then the part of the objective for the ex-ante type 2 in this interval is




If µ2(θ̂) ≥ 0 for some θ̂ ∈ (θ1, θ2) then because of (DHR), µ2(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ≥ θ̂ and, therefore,
we can always find a better solution by setting x?2(θ) = 1 for all θ ≥ θ̂ (note that this does not








otherwise we could decrease χ and obtain an strict improvement in the objective. Now, consider
splitting the interval in half, that is, take θ̂ = (θ1 + θ2)/2 and note that because of (DHR) we












We can modify x?2(θ) in (θ1, θ2) as follows and obtain an, at least weakly, objective improvement.
For θ ∈ (θ1, θ̂) set x?2(θ) = χ − ε1 and for θ ∈ (θ̂, θ2) set x?2(θ) = χ + ε2 with ε1, ε2 > 0, and such
























which thanks to equation (23) is non-negative. Then we can keep increasing ε2 until either
χ − ε1 = x?2(θ
−




2 ). This proofs we can, at least weakly, improve the objective.
It also proves that we can modify the solution in such a way that for one of the two halves of the
intervals the step reaches the boundary bound given by either x?2(θ
−




2 ). For the half that
did not reach the boundary, we can do the same procedure described above and then repeat this







that this process can be potentially infinite, in which case a more rigorous argument is required.
Suppose the process described above goes for infinitely many steps. In this case, an allocation
sequence {xn2 (θ)}n∈N defined in [θ1, θ2] is generated. To prove that the argument works, we need
















To prove this, let {θn, θn, θ̂n}n∈N be the sequence generated in the infinite process where:
– θn and θn correspond to the lower and upper bound of the interval. For example, at the
beginning θ1 = θ1 and θ1 = θ2. At the next iteration we will have either θ2 = θ1 and θ2 = θ̂
or θ2 = θ̂ and θ2 = θ2. Note that for all n ∈ N: θn, θn ∈ [θ1, θ2].
– θ̂n is defined to be the half of the interval. So θ̂1 = θ̂, and θ̂2 = (θ2 + θ2)/2.
From these definitions we have that θn and θn are bounded monotonic sequences (the first non-





then all three quantities, θn, θn and θ̂n, converge to the same limit which we denote by θ∞ ∈ [θ1, θ2]









1 ) if θ < θ∞
x?2(θ
+
2 ) if θ ≥ θ∞,
a.s in [θ1, θ2]. (25)
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To see why (25) holds, consider θ ∈ [θ1, θ∞) then from the convergence of θn we have
∃n0 ∈ N,∀n ≥ n0, θ < θn ≤ θ∞.
Then, from the way xn2 is constructed, it must be the case that x
n




1 ). A similar
argument holds for θ ∈ (θ∞, θ2]. Thus, xn2 (θ) satisfies the almost surely convergence in equation
(25). Finally, we can use the almost surely version of the dominated convergence theorem to
obtain (24). This completes the proof for ex-ante type 2 and case (2).
Proof for the reminder of the properties:














s.t χ ∈ [0, 1], θ1 ≤ θ3











• u1 = 0: From the formulation above it is clear that is always optimal to set u1 = 0.
• θ̂1 ≤ θ1: Suppose the opposite, that is, θ̂1 > θ1. This implies that between θ1 and θ̂1, µ1(·) is
negative. Then, we can increase θ1 while keeping feasibility and, at the same time, increasing
the objective function. Note this argument is also valid when θ1 = θ3. Also, note that we can
obtain a strict improvement only when χ > 0; however, when χ = 0 we can only obtain a weak
improvement. In either case, we can always consider θ̂1 ≤ θ1.
• θ2 ≤ θ̂2: Suppose the opposite, θ2 > θ̂2. Since µ(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ θ̂2, we can can decrease θ2 and
obtain an objective improvement while maintaining feasibility.











otherwise, we could decrease u2 and, by doing so, improve the objective.
Since u2 > 0, equation (26) yields


























which implies ∫ θ1
θ2
F̄2(z)dz < 0,
a contradiction. Thus, θ1 < θ2.
Now consider, a new contract for type 2 which consists on decreasing the cut-off θ2 by ε > 0
sufficiently small, but at the same time maintaining the equality in equation (26). Specifically, let











note that by taking ε small we still have u2(ε) > 0. We claim that this new contract, character-
ized by θ1, θ3, χ, θ2(ε) and u2(ε), yields a larger objective that the old contract, characterized by






















We obtain a similar expression for the new contract’s objective. Specifically, the first two terms
in the expression above are the same and the third term differs in θ2. Hence, the new contract






Since θ2(ε) < θ2 this last inequality is true. Thus, if u2 > 0 we can always construct a new
contract yielding a larger objective value and, therefore, at any optimal contract we must have
u2 = 0.






















which implies θ2 = θ3, a contradiction.
• θ1 ≤ θ2: First we show that θ1 ≤ θ̂2. Suppose the opposite, that is, θ1 > θ̂2. Then, since θ̂2 ≥ θ2



























That is, the IC constraint is not binding. Therefore, since θ1 > θ̂2 ≥ θ̂1 we can slightly decrease
θ1 and, in this way, obtain an objective improvement whenever χ > 0. When χ = 0, because
θ3 ≥ θ1, we can decrease θ3 and obtain an objective improvement as well. Hence, at any optimal
solution we must have θ1 ≤ θ̂2.









Using that θ1 ≤ θ̂2 implies θ2 < θ̂2, we can slightly increase θ2 (maintaining feasibility) and thus
obtain an objective improvement. In conclusion, at any optimal solution we must have θ1 ≤ θ2.











s.t χ ∈ [0, 1]










It is easy to see that if the static contract is an optimal solution to (PdR) then it is also an optimal
solution to (Pd). This is true because the optimal value of (PdR) is always an upper bound to the
optimal value of (Pd), and the static contract is always feasible for (Pd).
For the other direction, suppose that the static contract is an optimal solution to (Pd) but is not an
optimal solution to (PdR). We will find a contract that is feasible for (Pd) and yields a larger objective
than the the static contract.












This is true because the static contract (u1, u2, x1, x2) = (0, 0,1{θ≥θ2},1{θ≥θ2}) is a feasible contract
for (Pd) and, therefore, it must yield a lower objective than the optimal static contract. Under the
current assumption, the optimal static contract yields a strictly lower objective than the solution to
(PdR). Therefore, equation (28) holds.














Also, since χ ≤ 1 we must have θ1 < θ2.
Now we argue that the contract optimizing (PdR) is feasible for (Pd). Since the high to low IC




















When θ2 = θ3, equation (30) trivially holds. So, assume θ2 < θ3. Then, to see why (30) continues to






























































Using this, together with equation (29), delivers equation (30). This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof relies on the global theory of constrained optimization. Specifi-
cally, we make use of Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217) and of Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969,
p. 220).
We begin by seeting up the stage for the proof. Define the set of functions
F , {x : [0, θ̄] −→ [0, 1] : x(·) is non-decreasing},
that is, F is the set of all feasible allocations. Then, the domain we are optimizing on is
Ω , R× R×F ×F .
An element of Ω is (u1, u2, x1, x2), the ex-post utility for the lowest ex-post type for both ex-ante
types and, the allocation schedule for each ex-ante type. The constraints of the problem are the
ex-post individually rationality constraints and the ex-ante incentive compatibility constraints. The
optimization problem is then
(Pd) max
(u1,u2,x1,x2)∈Ω





















u1, u2 ≥ 0.
Note that from Corollary 4 we can relax the low to high IC constraint. We present here a more general
proof which does not relay on any relaxation. Nonetheless, the next argument also applies to the relaxed
formulation.
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The lagrangian for this problem is





α1µ1(z)f1(z) + λ1F̄1(z)− λ2F̄2(z)
]
dz





α2µ2(z)f2(z)− λ1F̄1(z) + λ2F̄2(z)
]
dz,
where w1, w2 ≥ 0 are the multipliers associated to the ex-post individually rationality constraints and,
λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 are the multipliers associated to the ex-ante incentive compatibility constraints.
Now we are ready to begin the proof. We prove both implications separately. Suppose first that the
static contract is optimal, we want to prove that condition (NR) holds. We proceed by contradiction.
So assume (NR) does not hold, then by Lemma 6 there exist θa < θ












We resort to Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217). In order to use the theorem we need to verify
the interior, or Slater, condition. So we need to find (u1, u2, x1, x2) ∈ Ω such that









































































Putting equations (33) and (34) together implies











Now, take u1 = u2 > 0 and
x1(θ) =

0 if θ < θa
χ if θa ≤ θ ≤ θb
1 if θb < θ
and
x2(θ) =
0 if θ < θ
s
1 if θs ≤ θ,
then is not hard to check that for this choice of (u1, u2, x1, x2) ∈ Ω the interior condition is satisfied, as
required. Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 217) gives then the existence of Lagrange multipliers and
it also states that the static contract
(u1, u2, x1, x2) = (0, 0,1{θ≥θs},1{θ≥θs}),
40
should maximize the lagrangean. In other words, ∃,λ,w ≥ 0 such that
L(0, 0,1{θ≥θs},1{θ≥θs},λ,w) ≥ L(u,x,λ,w), ∀(u1, u2, x1, x2) ∈ Ω. (35)
Since this is for any (u1, u2, x1, x2) ∈ Ω we can take u1, u2 = 0, x2 defined as above and two possible



































































For the other direction we assume condition (NR) holds and we want to verify the static contract is
optimal. In order to do so we use Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 220). This theorem states that if
we are able to find lagrange multipliers λ,w ≥ 0 for which equation (35) holds, then the static contract
is optimal.
So, set the lagrange multipliers as follows
w1 = α1 − α2c22(θs), w2 = α2 + α2c22(θs), λ1 = 0, λ2 = −α2c22(θs), (37)
these multipliers are non-negative because c22(θs) ≤ 0 and
w2 = α2 + α2c
22(θs) ≥ 0⇔ c22(θs) ≥ −1⇔ [θs − h22(θs)] ≥ −h22(θs)⇔ θs ≥ 0.

















To prove this first note that the optimal solution x1 on the left hand side of (38) is of the threshold
























































which thanks to Lemma 4 contradicts condition (NR). This proves equation (38).
Now, recall our choice of lagrange multipliers in (37) and consider the lagrangean evaluated at some







































































where in (a) we have used (38) and the fact that
α2µ2(θ)f2(θ) + λ2F̄2(θ) ≥ 0⇔ c22(θ) ≥ c22(θs),
which, since c22(·) is increasing, holds if and only θ ≥ θs. Thus, we have proved that for this choice of
lagrange multipliers the static contract maximizes the lagrangen and, therefore, thanks to Theorem 1
in Luenberger (1969, p. 220) it is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3. Take θa, θb from Lemma 6. In the proof of Theorem 2 we already saw
that this allocation is feasible. So we only need to verify that it yields a larger payoff than the static
contract, that is, we want∫ θ̄
θs


































which is exactly the property satisfied by θa, θb.









thus we end up with the same optimization problem that in the proof of Theorem 1: (PdR).
We use Theorem 1 in Luenberger (1969, p. 220) to prove that the proposed solution actually
optimizes (PdR). Then, we show that this solution is feasible for the original problem and, therefore,
optimal.
For easy of notation set θ1 = θ1, θ2 = θ2 and θ3 = θ1. With this notation our assumptions are:
there exists θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ3 such that
1. C12(θ1, θ3) ≤ minθ3≤θ≤θ̄ C12(θ3, θ).
2. max0≤θ≤θ3 C12(θ, θ3) ≤ C12(θ1, θ3)
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3. α1 · C12(θ1, θ3) + α2c22(θ2) = 0.
Note that from this condition is immediate that θ̂1 ≤ θ1 and θ2 ≤ θ̂2. For easy of exposition we
assume θ1 < θ2 < θ3, but the next argument still goes through if we don’t assume this.
Now, the Lagrangean for (PdR) is
















consider the following multipliers







, w1 = λ+ α1, w2 = −λ+ α2,
note that λ and w1 are trivially non-negative, and for w2 we have
w2 ≥ 0⇔ α2 + α2c22(θ2) ≥ 0⇔ c22(θ2) ≥ −1⇔ [θ2 − h22(θ2)] ≥ −h22(θ2)⇔ θ2 ≥ 0,



















If we are able to show that L(x,u,λ,w) evaluated at our candidate solution is an upper bound for the




































where in the first equality we used condition (3) and the inequality comes from the fact that c22(·) is
























































































In order to conclude the proof we need to verify the proposed solution is indeed feasible for the
original problem. That is, we need to verify it satisfies equation (40) (note the other (IC) constraint is

















































and, therefore, under our assumption equation (42) is verified. This concludes the proof.
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B Proofs for section 4














































s(λ1−λ2) ≤ θs · e−θ
s(λ1−λ2) ⇐⇒ θs ≤ 1
λ1 − λ2
. (46)
























contradicting the fact that condition (NR) holds.













⇐⇒ λ2 · (θse−λ1θ
s
− θe−λ1θ) ≥ (e−λ2θ
s
− e−λ2θ) · (λ1θs − 1) · e−θ
s(λ1−λ2)





s)) · (λ1θs − 1) ≥ 0,
so we just need to see that this las inequality holds for θ ≤ θs. For doing so define
H(θ) , λ2θ




s)) · (λ1θs − 1),
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− 1) · (λ1θs − 1) ≥ λ2θs + λ2θs(λ1θs − 1) = λ2θs · λ1θs > 0,
where the inequality comes from convexity of the exponential function and the fact that θs ≥ 1/λ1.
Furthermore the derivative of H is given by
dH
dθ
= λ2(λ1θ − 1)e−λ1(θ−θ
s) − λ2(λ1θs − 1)e−λ2(θ−θ
s),
and it can be easily verified that for θ ≤ θs we have dH/dθ ≤ 0. This together to the facts that H(0) > 0













Now we prove that for θ ≥ θs we have gU (θ) ≥ gU (θs). Note that if we prove this we are done because
this and what we have just proven imply condition (NR). As before we do










− θe−λ1θ) ≥ (λ1θs − 1) · (e−λ2θ
s
− e−λ2θ) · e−θ
s(λ1−λ2)
⇐⇒ λ2(θs − θe−λ1(θ−θ
s))− (λ1θs − 1) · (1− e−λ2(θ−θ
s)) ≥ 0,
note that the LHS of this last inequality is again the function H(·) but this time defined for θ ≥ θs. We
have H(θs) = 0. It is easy to prove that for θs ≤ θ ≤ θ̃ the function H(θ) is increasing, and then for




s − (λ1θs − 1) ≥ 0,
hence for θ ≥ θs we have H(θ) ≥ 0 and, therefore, gU (θ) ≥ gU (θs) for all θ ≥ θs, as desired.














therefore, for any αL ∈ [0, 1] equation (3) is satisfied. Then by Proposition 1 we conclude that the static
contract is optimal for any αL ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof of Corollary 2. First we show θs(·) is continuous from the right at zero. Let {αnL} ∈ [0, 1]




and suppose θs(αnL) does not converge to θ
s(0) = 1/λH . That is,
∃ε > 0, ∀n0,∃n ≥ n0, |
1
λH







− θs(αnL)| > ε⇐⇒
1
λH
− θs(αnL) > ε.
This in turn means that we can create a subsequence {α`nL } ⊂ {αnL} such that
∀n, 1
λH
− ε > θs(α`nL ). (49)
But since θs(α`nL ) is a maximizer of R
s(·) we must have
α`nL θ
s(α`nL )e
−λLθs(α`nL ) + (1− α`nL )θ
s(α`nL )e









because λL > λH we can bound the LHS above to obtain
θs(α`nL )e








−λH 1λH . (50)
Note that the function θe−λHθ has a unique maximum at θ = 1/λH and since θ
s(α`nL ) satisfies equation





−λH( 1λH +δ(ε)) > θs(α`nL )e
−λHθs(α`nL ), ∀n,













−λH 1λH , ∀n,
so taking the limit over n gives a contradiction. In conclusion we have proved that θs(·) is continuous








but since θs(0) = 1/λH and θ








so thanks to Proposition 1, the dynamic contract is optimal when we set αL > ᾱ1. Note that the same
arguments is valid for 1/λL. That is, we can show that θ
s(αL) is continuos from the left at 1/λL and














hence in [ᾱ2, 1] the static contract is optimal. All of this implies that since θ
s(·) is a non-increasing
function we can always find ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) with the desired property.
Proof of Corollary 3. Fix λH and αL. Suppose the result is not true, that is,




From this we can construct a sequence λnL ≥ 2λH such that
lim
n→∞
λnL =∞ and θs(λnL) ≤
1
λnL − λH
, ∀n ∈ N,












However, since θs(λnL) maximizes R











−λH 1λH ≤ Rs(θs(λnL)).





−λH 1λH ≤ 0,
a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. We need to find θ1 = θL, θ2 = θH and θ3 such that θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ3 and
the following conditions are satisfied
1. C12(θ1, θ3) ≤ minθ3≤θ≤θ̄ C12(θ3, θ).
2. max0≤θ≤θ3 C12(θ, θ3) ≤ C12(θ1, θ3)
3. α1 · C12(θ1, θ3) + α2c22(θ2) = 0.
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And then we can apply Theorem 3.
First note that since the support of the exponential distribution is unbounded from above, we can
take θ3 =∞ which eliminates condition (1). Conditions (2) and (3) can be cast as
θ1e
−θ1(λ1−λ2) ≥ θe−θ(λ1−λ2) ∀θ ≥ 0 and α1 · λ2θ1e−θ1(λ1−λ2) = −α2 · (λ2θ2 − 1), (51)























−λ2θ1 < 0. (52)

















−λ2θ1 = α1θ1(λ1 − λ2)e−λ1θ1 + α1θ1λ2e−λ1θ1 + α2θ1λ2e−λ2θ1














































where (a) comes from equation (53), (b) is true because the function −e−λ2θ increasing and θ1 < θs,
(c) comes from equation (2). And (d) comes from θ1 < θ
s. With this we have proven (52) and thus















































but replacing θ1 with 1/(λ1 − λ2) in this last expression we get θ2 > θ1.
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